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ABSTRACT 
In accordance with federal law, the President is required to present to Congress a budget 
of the United States government by February of each year.  This action marks the 
beginning of the legislative phase of the federal budget process.  This thesis provides a 
systematic analysis of communication between the executive branch and Congress 
regarding the defense budget.  A quantitative content analysis of the President’s budget 
press releases and published transcripts from the Senate Armed Services Committee 
(SASC) authorization for appropriations hearings on military posture from fiscal years 
2001 to 2010, will demonstrate that the framework of the President’s budget press 
releases can guide issue attention in Congressional hearings, and that Congress uses 
congressional hearings to frame their own issues.  The SASC hearings provide the first 
opportunity for Congress to collectively engage in constructive dialogue with the 
SECDEF and the CJCS following the release of the President’s budget. 
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Federal budgeting is a highly structured and complex process that involves a 
variety of procedures requiring exhaustive coordination between executive and legislative 
branch officials.  Article I of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the “power of the 
purse,” that is, the power to lay and collect taxes, borrow money, and pay debts as 
necessary to ensure the general welfare of the United States and its citizens.  It also 
requires that all money drawn from the Treasury be subsequent to appropriations made 
by law.  The Constitution does not explicitly stipulate the President’s role in the nation’s 
financial management process, nor does it provide a framework for how this process 
should be carried out.  
Over the years, several laws have prescribed the way the nation’s finances are 
managed.  Two of the most notable budget laws were the Budgeting and Accounting Act 
of 1921 and the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.  The Budgeting and Accounting Act 
of 1921 created the requirement for presidents to annually prepare and submit a 
comprehensive spending plan to Congress.  The passage of this act also established the 
Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of Management and Budget [OMB]), which was 
created to delineate budget guidance and assist the President with the formulation and 
execution of the federal budget.  The passage of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 
established the congressional budget and formalized the congressional budget process.  It 
also established the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to assist Congress in handling 
budgetary matters.  Prior to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Congress played a 
minimal role in the federal budget process (Meyer, 2002, p. 73).  
The federal budget cycle includes four phases: (1) executive formulation, (2) 
congressional action, (3) budget execution, and (4) audit and evaluation.  During the 
executive formulation phase, OMB works closely with federal agencies to formulate their 
budget requests.  OMB assists the agencies with resolving conflicts and provides 
guidance concerning the impact of potential policy initiatives and economic projections 
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on each agency’s request.  “Agencies are supposed to justify the President’s 
recommendations, not their own.  OMB maintains an elaborate legislative clearance 
process to ensure that agency budget justifications, testimony, and other submissions are 
consistent with presidential policy” (Keith & Schick, 2003, p. xxi).  
The President is required to present to Congress a budget of the United States 
government by February of each year.  The budget typically begins with the President’s 
message to Congress and is followed by a summary and justification of major proposals 
associated with each federal agency.  The President’s budget is a management tool, 
which reflects national priorities.  It is a detailed plan of how financial resources of the 
U.S. government should be allocated.  The President’s budget is also a policy tool, which 
is used to control and coordinate activities of the government. 
It is important to note that the President’s budget is only a request to Congress.  
Once the President’s budget is finalized, it is presented to the press and handed off to 
Congress, where a series of hearings take place in which the President’s budget is 
explained and defended.  Congress can accept the budget as is, modify it, or reject it all 
together.  The Senate and House Budget committees hold hearings and receive testimony 
from various civil and military officials on matters concerning the budget.  During this 
process, other congressional committees simultaneously review the President’s budget 
with respect to the programs in their jurisdiction.  These committees present the Budget 
committees with “views and estimates” of their respective programs, which takes into 
account information gathered from the hearings, expert opinions, and congressional 
reports generated by the CBO.  The Armed Services committees do this for defense 
matters.  The Senate and House budget committees are responsible for aggregating this 
information and formulating a concurrent resolution on the budget by mid-April.  
Section 301 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 requires that the content of 
the concurrent resolution on the budget include: (1) totals of new budget authority and 
outlays, (2) federal revenues and the impact of spending on debt and deficit, (3) spending 
broken down by functional category, (4) reconciliation and policy directives, and (5) 
other mechanisms of budget enforcement and control.  More simply stated, the 
concurrent budget resolution sets the total spending levels for each of the nineteen budget 
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functions for the next five or more years, and estimates the revenues that the government 
expects collect.  Budget authority for discretionary spending is allocated in a single 
binding number by the concurrent budget resolution to the Senate and House 
Appropriations committees.  From there, the appropriations committees allocate budget 
authority amongst subcommittees responsible for the twelve regular appropriations acts.  
All regular appropriations acts must follow authorizing legislation.  Legislative 
committees within Congress are responsible for creating, modifying, or cutting existing 
programs.  No discretionary program can be appropriated funds without receiving the 
proper authority to exist.  
The Department of Defense (DoD) typically is appropriated approximately half of 
all discretionary spending, which puts it at the epicenter of all budgetary debates.  The 
DoD formulates its budget through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 
Execution (PPBE) system.  The PPBE system attempts to match resources to programs, 
which are in alignment with our nation’s political and military objectives.  In the 
executive formulation phase of the federal budget process, DoD leaders work closely 
with OMB and executive branch officials to plan a budget that is aligned with the goals 
of the President.  Concurrent with the rollout of the President’s budget, the Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF) traditionally holds a press conference, which highlights the key 
elements of the DoD budget request.  In the ensuing weeks, the SECDEF, along with 
other high-ranking military officials, will justify and defend the DoD’s budget request in 
a series of congressional hearings.  
A detailed overview of the federal budget process and the DoD PPBE system is 
not necessary to describe.  For an in-depth description see Keith and Schick, 2003; Jones 
and McCaffery, 2008; Lee, Johnson, and Joyce, 2008.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Constitutional doctrine guarantees separation of powers between the executive 
and legislative branches of government through a system of checks and balances.  
Although constitutional powers are distinct, both sides are dependent upon one another.  
“Collaboration between the two elective branches lies at the heart of the successes—and 
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failures—of our government” (Davidson, 2002, p. 71).  As noted by Thurber (2002), 
“intense rivalry between the President and Congress is inevitable in an electoral system 
that can produce divided party control of the two branches” (p. 16); therefore, 
communication is essential for the effective and efficient execution of government. 
The lives of many people are affected by budget decisions made by the U.S. 
government.  The federal budget process involves a plethora of government actors who 
have different values and ideals, are motivated by independent factors, and are influenced 
by a variety of distinct individuals.  Communication amongst these actors must be 
appropriately acknowledged as a critical element in order to conciliate conflicting 
priorities.  The role of political discourse is important as it pertains to the federal 
budgetary process of the United States, especially during a time of increased budgetary 
tensions.  “How an issue or policy is talked about is almost as important as what it 
actually is” (Andres & Griffin, 2002, p. 152).  Enhanced communication can improve 
efficiency of the budgeting process, but at times “the development of the federal budget 
often appears to be a disjointed effort between two branches of government that fail to 
effectively communicate with one another or coordinate their efforts” (Cullather, 1995, p. 
1). 
Given the importance of discourse in the federal budget process, examining 
communication between the executive branch and Congress in the context of DoD budget 
issues deserves more attention.  Systematic analysis of how the executive branch and 
Congress frame the debate on DoD budgetary issues is an important stepping-stone to 
understand how federal budget priorities are determined.  
C. OBJECTIVE  
The primary objectives of this thesis are as follows:  (1) provide a brief 
background of the federal budgetary process and create a context in which content 
analysis plays an important role in understanding the relationships between the executive 
branch of government and Congress from a communications perspective, (2) identify the 
key themes of the President’s budget for the DoD through the SECDEF’s published press  
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releases, and (3) evaluate how Congress frames the debate on DoD budget issues by 
analyzing their response to the release of the President’s budget. This content analysis 
was driven by one basic research question:  
• To what extent does Congress respond to the President’s message framing 
of the annual defense budget? 
A satisfactory answer to the primary research question will include a discussion of 
the themes and trends in the key issues and concerns that either Congress or the executive 
branch are concerned about.  This thesis will provide valuable insight on the relationship 
between congressional committees and the executive branch as it relates to the defense 
budget. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how Congress and the executive branch 
frame the debate on defense-focused budget issues.  This research will not only add to the 
literature that currently addresses the communication and coordination issues between the 
executive branch and Congress, but will also highlight the importance of message 
characteristics in understanding how budgetary priorities are determined. 
There are a limited number of applications of the content analytic research 
method in the political science field.  This thesis will further demonstrate and validate 
content analysis as a viable and useful tool for providing a quantitative representation of 
qualitative data, especially as it pertains to policy science.   
E. ORGANIZATION 
The introduction begins with a description of the responsibilities of the executive 
branch and Congress on financial matters as set forth by the U.S. Constitution.  There 
have been a few major legislative acts which have affected the framework of the federal 
budgetary process adhered to today.  A brief overview of the federal budget process is 
provided.  The purpose of Chapter I is to establish the context in which the 
communication between the executive branch and Congress is important to study.  
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Chapter II examines the current literature that discusses the relationships between 
the executive branch and Congress from a communications perspective.  The concepts of 
framing, priming, and agenda setting are explored.  A brief overview of content analysis 
is presented.  This chapter ends with a survey of the literature in which the application of 
content analysis has been directed toward the policy sciences.  
Chapters III–V takes the reader on a systematic approach to answering the 
primary research question presented earlier.  Results and conclusions are reported, 
followed by recommendations for further study.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on political communications is highly fragmented.  Political 
scientists and cognitive researchers saturate the field of study with broad approaches from 
varying perspectives.  McGraw (2000) captures this phenomenon precisely by stating 
that, “although the pluralistic nature of the discipline is perhaps its most defining quality, 
there has also been an ebb and flow in the paradigms that have dominated political 
psychology scholarship” (p. 806).  This discontinuity in the literature makes it difficult to 
build upon prior research.  Subsequent to a thorough examination of scholarly articles 
and books, much of the literature can be aggregated in a manner representative of two 
very consistent approaches.  In the first approach, the research impetus is directed 
towards examining the legislative response to executive budget proposals.  The second 
approach is theoretical, and deals with the dynamics of what Thurber (2002) refers to as 
“message politics” (p. 169).  
A. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO EXECUTIVE BUDGET PROPOSALS 
The federal budget process has evolved in a manner that inhibits communication 
between the Executive and Congress.  A chain of budget laws have redefined political 
responsibilities and provided a “congressional opportunity structure” (Sheingate, 2006) 
that allows participants to assert a more dominant sphere of influence on defense policy.  
Both sides produce a budget that often reflects disparate policy goals and competing 
priorities.  A lack of communication is more transparent as the polarization of political 
parties becomes more distinct, and the growing mistrust in the management of federal 
agencies perpetuates throughout the government in the form of budget debates.  “The 
lack of coordination and communication is often viewed as a symptom of a divided 
government,” which as a result, has “hindered the efficiency of the budget process” 
(Cullather, 1995, p. 511).  Wildavsky and Caiden (2004) refer to the budgetary process as 
a “process of opposites” (p. 220).   
Historically, researchers have approached the communication between the 
executive branch and Congress from varying perspectives.  Seldom has Congress and the 
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Executive agreed in whole on matters concerning the defense budget.  Researchers tend 
to agree that there exists a lack of communication between the two branches of 
government.  Thurber (2002) put it best when he said that, “understanding the dance 
between president’s and lawmakers requires a broader perspective” (p. 158).  Much of 
the literature on presidential-congressional communications has focused on the “why” of 
communications—as in why is there a lack of communication on certain policy issues, 
and not the “how” of communications—as in how much do these two sides actually 
communicate on certain issues.  A lack of communication, in a budgetary context, is an 
effect of the differences between how each side handles budgetary matters.   
“Change in budgeting means change in politics” (Schick, 1978, p. 65).  Thurber 
(1988) examined how the Budget Impoundment and Control Act of 1974 and the 1985 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (commonly referred to as the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act) affected congressional-presidential relations on budgetary 
matters.  These two reforms were attempts by Congress “to recapture presidential 
domination of the budget-making process” (Thurber, 1988, p. 102).  His findings suggest 
that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act and the 1974 budget act have strained the 
budgeting relationship between the president and Congress.  These two reforms have 
increased the number of actors in the budgeting process, created a budgeting process 
more independent of the president, and forced the executive staff to work closer with 
Congress (Thurber, 1988, p. 112).  Budgeting, as a result, has become “more conflictual 
and difficult for the president and Congress” (Thurber, 1988, p. 112).  
The scholarly debate on the relationship between the executive branch and 
Congress gravitates more toward who exercises control over the nation’s priorities, rather 
than assessing the underlying stimuli responsible for their differing views.  Aspin (1975) 
implicitly charges that the fight over control is a consequence of the expansion in scope 
of the Executive and the departure of Congress from the traditional role as a conduit for 
constituent concern, overseer of government programs and policies, and protector of the 
process of government (p. 174).  Typically when Congress opposes the views of the 
Executive, “it is usually to protect some interest group or some aspect of the status quo 
rather than to initiate action” (Aspin, 1975, p. 173). 
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Cullather (1995) offers a somewhat similar view in that “the Executive and 
legislative branches do not share common perspectives” (p. 516).  He states that, “the 
president is required to examine policies from a national perspective, while individual 
senators and representatives must consider the impact of government policies on their 
constituents” (Cullather, 1995, p. 516).  Cullather (1995) advocates the use of budget 
summits as a tool to improve the communication and coordination between the executive 
branch and Congress.  He believes that budget summits are the most effective way to 
achieve consensus between Congress and the President.  Congress does not react to 
legislation proposed by the President in the same manner that the public reacts.  The lack 
of recognition of the latter, Cullather (1995) states is “due to the lack of coordination 
between Congress and the president” (p. 516).   
Competing priorities has been the topic of favor for some political science 
scholars.  Kamlet and Mowery (1987) examined various influences on budgetary 
priorities in the executive branch and Congress.  Their model assesses the relative 
influence (interdependence) on budgetary outcomes of fiscal, political, macroeconomic, 
and programmatic spending pressures.  Kamlet and Mowery (1987) use the figures 
proposed in the President’s budget and the congressional modification of those figures as 
a measure of budgetary priorities.  Their findings suggest that the executive branch 
budgets are more interdependent than congressional budgets.  The empirical results 
implicitly suggest a lack of communication and coordination between the executive 
branch and Congress.  Competing budgetary priorities are merely a symptom of such 
nature.  
Kanter’s (1972) research on the congressional modifications of the President’s 
defense budget employed a less sophisticated model than that of Kamlet and Mowery.  
His argument reiterated the universally acknowledged principle that congressional 
scrutiny of the budget favored a programmatic and fiscal orientation (see Mayar, 1993; 
Art, 1985; Blackmon, 1975) Kanter examined the changes made to the President’s budget 
by both the House and Senate.  He concluded that, “it is the programmatic explanations 
that have the greatest potential significance for defense policy” (p. 142).  Maintaining  
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tight control over fiscal posture is still at the forefront of the congressional priority list; 
however, Kanter’s (1972) findings indicate an ever-increasing desire for Congress to 
influence defense policy objectives (p. 142).   
Research by Shull (1979) suggests that the lack of communication and 
coordination between the executive branch and Congress is attributed to differences in 
how each side views federal agencies.  Shull examined the interaction between 
presidential support for agencies and Congress’ reaction to the President’s position on the 
policies relating to those agencies.  He proposes that agencies attempt to increase the 
communication between the executive and Congress in order to increase chances at 
obtaining “budget success.”  When Congress agrees with the agency’s policy direction, 
they are more likely to support the President’s position on the budget.  The assumption 
here is that the President himself supports the agency’s policy direction as well.  Shull 
criticizes his own work by acknowledging that the statistical relationships in his model 
are low.  He justified the significance of his work by characterizing his efforts as an early 
attempt at establishing a linkage between communication and coordination and the 
support or non-support for federal agencies. Shull’s hypothesis stands alone amongst 
similar studies and deserves further investigation.  This thesis is designed to help fill the 
void in the political communications literature by addressing issues similar to those 
examined by Shull. 
A personal observation is that the tone of the policy debate on the defense budget 
has become sharper in recent years.  Congressional scrutiny of the defense budget has 
been characterized by some as micromanagement.  “Micromanagement is best viewed as 
a problem of competition among political actors for policy control” (Mayar, 1993, p. 
294).  In his research, Mayar (1993) selected the number of defense budget line item 
changes by Congress as a measure of congressional activity on the defense budget.  His 
research findings support that, “congressional activism is a direct function of policy and 
budgetary disputes between Congress and DoD” (p. 293).  Works by Laurance (1976) 
and Lindsay (1987) clearly support an increasing insertion of Congress into the defense 
policy-making arena.  The “outside game” as branded by Lindsay (1987), refers to the 
changes in congressional decision making on defense policy that emerged during the 
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1980s (p. 382).  Congressional involvement in defense has become more visible and 
“much activity has bypassed the traditional channels of power within the defense 
committees” (Lindsay, 1987, p. 382).  The “outside game” has motivated congressional 
actors to become more involved with a wider range of issues.  The implications are that 
defense issues are more representative of individual views, consequently leading to 
delays in the budgetary cycle, the erosion of the committee system, and increased 
micromanagement of the DoD (Lindsay, 1987).  The mistrust and subsequent 
micromanagement of government agencies results in a self-perpetuating relationship that 
further breaks down communication.  
There is an abundance of literature with specific focus on the process of 
communications.  “The relationship between the branches is complex, dynamic, and 
fraught with misunderstanding” (Thurber, 2002, p. 160). Understanding why the 
executive branch and Congress sometimes fail to communicate is relevant because the 
decisions that get made on Capitol Hill affect the daily lives of the public.  In no way do 
the aforementioned studies cover the broad array of theories and examinations that 
address the interpersonal and organizational relationships between the President and 
Congress.  
B. FRAMING, PRIMING, AND AGENDA SETTING 
Political communications is narrowly defined as, “the activity of specialized 
institutions that disseminate information, ideas, and attitudes about the political system” 
(Abacarian & Soule, 1971, p. 8).  Much of the literature on political communications 
consists of attempts to conceptualize the effects that strategic political messages and news 
media coverage have on the public (Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997).  News media 
coverage of politically controversial issues has been proven to induce favorable effects on 
public perception (e.g., Iyengar, 1996).  The concepts of framing, priming, and agenda 
setting are grounded in the fields of social and behavioral science.  The importance of 
these concepts to research in political science has been realized through their noteworthy 
application in journalism and strategic decision-making.   
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Framing, agenda setting, and priming represent the most recent paradigm shift in 
political communication research (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 10).  These three 
models combine to construct the strategic arsenal that political elites use to advance their 
position.  The definitions of framing, priming, and agenda setting are similar, yet very 
distinct in meaning (Weaver, 2007).  Framing an issue refers to shaping a message in a 
way that influences how the audience understands that message (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 
2007).  Framing effects occur when “a speaker’s emphasis on a subset of potentially 
relevant considerations cause individuals to focus on these considerations when 
constructing their opinions” (Druckman, 2001, p. 1042).  Agenda setting and priming, 
often used interchangeably (Weaver, 2007), are “based on the memory-based models of 
information processing” (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 11).  Agenda setting is based 
on the idea that issues that are more salient influence an individual’s judgment, while 
priming refers to shaping the considerations people that people take into account when 
making decisions.  
The intent is not to get too overwhelmed in theory (for in depth overviews of 
framing, agenda setting, and priming, see Druckman, 2001; Scheufele, 1999; Scheufele & 
Tewksbury, 2007; Weaver, 2007).  The next two examples illustrate how some 
researchers have explored framing effects.  Druckman, Jacobs, and Ostermeier (2004) 
explored the priming strategies employed by political candidates.  They developed a 
framework that suggests a candidate’s priming strategy is driven by public opinion, the 
position and personality of competing candidates, and exogenous events (p. 1199).  
Barker (2005) evaluated how voters respond to different message frames during the 2000 
Republican nomination campaign.  His findings suggests that not only do people respond 
to frames more favorably when their values are similar to those of the messenger, but 
they also tend to more highly regard the messenger as well.  Druckman and Holmes’ 
(2004) study on President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address provided empirical 
evidence that the President can influence his approval rating by priming the issues that 
underlie his evaluation.  
Issue framing is an important concept in political science.  “Frames...become 
invaluable tools for presenting relatively complex issues...efficiently and in a way that 
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makes them accessible to lay audiences because they play to existing cognitive schemas” 
(Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 12).  How an issue is framed, plays an important role 
in the communication between political actors and their constituents.  
C. CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Communication is the foundation of all social interaction.  Effective 
communication is of paramount concern to organizations with high aspirations to thrive 
in dynamic environments.  Many successful groups and institutions place a heavy 
emphasis on the role that communication plays in their organizational structure.  
Conventional wisdom suggests that effective communication can be linked to increases in 
productivity, innovation, and operational effectiveness.  “It is thus axiomatic that the 
study of the processes and content of communication is basic to all social sciences” 
(Holsti, 1969, p. 596).  
Communication takes shape in many forms.  Greenbaum (1974) writes that, 
“organizational communication consists of various message sending and receiving 
phenomena affecting formal social units in which individuals work toward common 
goals” (p. 740).  Content analysis the application of the scientific method in the field of 
communication.  The goal of content analysis is to propose and test hypotheses which 
explain or makes inferences about a given phenomenon.  The purpose of content analysis 
has been described by Janowitz (1968):  
Content analysis can be used for making inferences from content back to 
the communicator, in which case the analyst is concerned with 
understanding the intentions, strategy, and goals of the communicator. 
Secondly, content analysis can be used to make inferences from the 
content to the audience, in which case the analyst is concerned with 
audience response and reaction (p. 648). 
Content analysis conforms to three basic principles: objectivity, systematic 
analysis, and generality (Holsti, 1969).  Objectivity implies that the analysis method is 
constrained by a formulated set of rules such that the same results can be attained by a 
different analyst.  Most researchers refer to this as reliability.  Systematic analysis 
requires that the inclusion or exclusion of content or categories follows consistent 
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collection criteria—this prevents material being selected which only supports the 
investigator’s hypothesis.  Generality means that the results must have theoretical 
relevance.  Systematic analysis and generality are forged into what more recent 
researchers refer to as validity. The basic structure of a credible content analysis, 
regardless of what topic or communication medium is being analyzed, must in some 
shape or form, resemble that of the scientific method.  
“The purpose of content-analysis research is to present a systematic and objective 
description of the attributes of communication,” (Holsti, 1969, p. 653).  In the field of 
content analysis, research is generally performed for two main reasons: (1) to describe the 
characteristics of communication content; (2) to make inferences about the causes or 
effects of communication content.  Table 1 adopted from Holsti (1969) summarizes three 
main purposes of content analysis and describes typical research question applicable to 
each purpose.  
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To make inferences 






To make inferences 
as to the antecedents 
of communication
To describe trends in communication
To relate known characteristics of sources to the messages they produce. 
To audit communication content against standards
To analyze techniques of persuasion
To analyze style
To relate known characteristics of the audience  to messages produced 
for them
To describe patterns of communication
To secure political and military intelligence
To analyze psychological traits of  individuals
To infer aspects of culture and cultural change
To provide legal evidence
To answer questions of disputed
authorship
To measure readability
To analyze the flow of information
To assess responses to communication
 
Table 1: The Purposes of Content Analysis 
Given the focus of this thesis is to examine how Congress and the executive 
branch frames the debate on DoD budget issues, content analysis is the best research 
method to answer the research questions listed above.  Content analysis will be used in 
this study to describe the characteristics of communication and to make inferences as the 
effects of communication.  Even though there is limited literature that applies the content 
analytic research method to the political sciences, the methodology has been proven as a 
viable tool to analyze budget rhetoric in presidential campaign speeches (Burden & 
Sanberg, 2003; Hart, Jarvis, & Lim, 2002), state of the union addresses (Moen, 1988; 
Druckman & Holmes, 2004), senate reports (Blackmon, 1975), and senatorial speeches 
(Tetlock, 1981).  The possibilities of applying this research method are endless.  
 
 16
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 17
III. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
The framework for analysis used herein is a derivative of the flowchart for the 
process of content analysis research proposed by Neuendorf (2002, pp. 50–51).  The 
thrust of this research process involved: (1) identifying the content to be examined, (2) 
defining the variables to be used in the study (conceptualizations), (3) developing a unit 
of data collection (operationalizations), (4) establishing computer coding schemes, (5) 
reporting results, and (6) assessing the reliability of the model.  
A. SELECTION OF RESEARCH MATERIALS  
The goal of this research project was to take an objective look inside the 
communications structure surrounding the executive branch and Congress, with particular 
focus on the defense budget.  The intent was to examine the communication and 
coordination between these two branches by comparing and contrasting how debates over 
defense policy and other concerning issues were framed.  
The research materials used in this thesis are the published transcripts of DoD 
authorization for appropriation hearings held before the SASC, and the President’s 
budget press releases regarding the defense budget the for the period covering fiscal years 
2001 to 2010.  This period encompasses leadership from three different presidents, three 
different defense secretaries, contains one major war, and has at least two changes of 
partisan leadership in the executive and legislative branches.  Thus said, ten years was 
considered a reasonable period of coverage to satisfy the objectives of this research 
project.  
1. SASC Hearings 
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 created the SASC.  The SASC is one 
of sixteen standing committees in the Senate and has jurisdiction and legislative oversight 
over matters relating to the common defense of the United States.  The Authorizations 
process is the “arena that the SASC displays the greatest potential for shaping defense 
policy or influencing specific program outcomes” (Blackmon, 1975, p. 19). Due to 
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jurisdictional coverage over the largest federal agency in the United States, the SASC can 
be considered as one of the most powerful and influential committees within the Senate.   
The DoD Authorization for Appropriations hearings before the SASC were 
selected as the primary research materials to represent the views of Congress concerning 
defense matters.  The hearings typically begin shortly after the President’s budget is 
released in early February, and can sometimes run into the summertime months.  The 
word “typically” is in italics to emphasize the volatility in the federal budget process.  
The SASC committee members typically begin the series of hearings with testimony 
from the SECDEF accompanied by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).  In 
subsequent hearings, SASC committee members hear testimony from the Service Chiefs, 
Service Secretaries, and Unified Combatant Commanders—each of which take place on 
different dates.  Hearings on major defense-related issues (i.e., ballistic missile defense 
and atomic energy) follow thereafter.  
This thesis focuses on the hearings in which the SECDEF is the primary witness.  
The SECDEF is called as the chief witness during the hearings on military posture.  The 
military posture hearings highlight the DoD’s key points of interest in the President’s 
budget.  It gives the SASC the opportunity to provide its committee members with a 
baseline justification of some of the key elements of the proposed defense budget.  
Committee members are able to respond to the SECDEF with questions or comments in a 
time-constrained atmosphere.  In addition to the question and answer period, committee 
members may also submit written statements (or questions) for the record; many of 
which are usually addressed by the SECDEF beforehand.  
The military posture hearings are important because they address the broad policy 
and program initiatives driving the overall defense debate.  Selection of research 
materials from the Senate was important because of term limits.  Six-year term limits in 
the Senate (as supposed to two-year limits in the House) allow greater consistency in the 
views of Congress.  It fosters greater preservation of values, stability, and provides less 
potential for outsider influence.  
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2. President’s Budget Press Releases 
The budget process is highly visible, and the media is a vehicle for public 
perception of that process.  When the President’s budget is released, the SECDEF 
normally holds a press conference in which he briefs the media on the defense-related 
portion of the President’s budget.  The press conference transcripts are made public 
record, and in recent years, the DoD has gone so far as releasing the budget briefing 
PowerPoint slides.  
The President’s budget press releases highlight key defense budget issues and are 
consistently available throughout the period analyzed.  Consistency in the availability of 
materials is important to validate the method of analysis employed in this thesis.  The 
budget briefing PowerPoint slides were initially the documents of choice for this research 
project, but they were not consistently available.  Aside from that, the press releases were 
the only “text-based” documents of record that highlighted the important features of the 
defense budget. 
B. CONCEPTUALIZATIONS 
Conceptualization is the process of determining and defining the variables to be 
used in a research study (Neuendorf, 2002).  Content analysis is a quantitative research 
methodology; however, the framework behind the analysis involves measures of 
subjectivity.  “There are as many possible schemes for classifying content data as there 
are questions which may be asked of the data” (Holsti, 1969, p. 644).  Neuendorf (2002) 
defines a variable as “a definable and measureable concept that varies; that is, it holds 
different values for different individual cases of units” (p. 95).  
Conceptualization is the most critical element of content analysis.  There is no 
universally accepted construct.  There have been many attempts to create universal value 
dictionaries1—much of which have been created are only applicable to a limited set of 
categorical data.  Ultimately, the analyst must decide, based on the content to be 
examined, which variable will best represent the data. 
                                                 
1 For example, Lasswell Value Dictionary and Harvard IV-4 Psychological dictionary.  Many content 
analysis computer programs are also now equipped with custom dictionaries. 
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1. Category Development  
Neuendorf (2002) recommends four techniques for the selection of variables: (1) 
a consideration of universal variables, (2) using theory and past research, (3) developing 
a grounded or emergent process, and (4) attempting to find medium-specific variables.  
The variables used in this research project are medium specific—that is, they are derived 
from the content itself. Categories were developed by: (1) extracting themes from the 
President’s budget press releases, and (2) letting additional categories emerge from 
analyzing the SASC hearing transcripts.  
The format of the President’s budget press releases was conducive to developing 
issue categories (variables).  The press releases were typically organized into five or six 
major budget themes.  Budget themes in the press releases were identified through major 
headings, which were typically in bold font and centered.  Issue categories were 
developed by aggregating the recurring budget themes of the President’s budget press 
releases over the period analyzed.  The aggregated list of recurring themes represents the 
general framework of the President’s budget press releases. 
Nine categories were constructed.  The nine categories (along with the 
subcategories to be discussed later) are as follows: 1) Quality of life services, 2) 
Supporting troops in the field, 3) Managing force readiness, 4) Investment in current 
capabilities, 5) Investment in future capabilities, 6) Managing internal processes, 7) 
Transforming DoD infrastructure, 8) Protecting the homeland, and 9) Other (Budget 
Related, Not Budget Related). The ninth (Other) category was included to meet the 
requirements of mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness and to aid in the development 
of subcategories.   
A note on subcategories.  All issues that were coded “Other” did not fit into the 
frame employed in the President’s budget press releases, and were appropriately placed 
into a set of subcategories.  The subcategories emerged as the coding process progressed, 
by grouping issues containing similar content.  The subcategories represent the additional 
framing employed by Congress, and will be discussed in detail in the results section. 
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2. Conceptual Definitions 
In the process of content analysis, each variable must be defined by what 
Neuendorf (2002) calls a “conceptual definition” or a “declaration by the researcher as to 
exactly what he or she wishes to study” (p. 107).  Conceptual definitions are dictionary-
type definitions.  It may be unclear as to which issues belong in each category.  The 
complexity and range of military affairs often makes it difficult to comprehensively 
define each variable; therefore, in order to assist the analyst in coding properly, the 
extensional definitions of each issue category are provided in the Appendix.  The 
extensional definition of a term is developed by means of specifying “terms” or “objects” 
that fall under the concept of the term in question.  The conceptual definitions of the 
variables used in this study are as follows:  
In the process of content analysis, each variable must be defined by what 
Neuendorf (2002) calls a “conceptual definition” or a “declaration by the researcher as to 
exactly what he or she wishes to study” (p. 107).  Conceptual definitions are dictionary-
type definitions.  It may be unclear as to which issues belong in each category.  The 
complexity and range of military affairs often makes it difficult to comprehensively 
define each variable; therefore, in order to assist the analyst in coding properly, the 
extensional definitions of each issue category are provided in the Appendix.  The 
extensional definition of a term is developed by means of specifying “terms” or “objects” 
that fall under the concept of the term in question.  The conceptual definitions of the 
variables used in this study are as follows:  
• Quality of life services:  Activities, services, or entitlements designed to 
enhance the quality of life of service members and their families.  Quality 
of life services are designed to increase or maintain high morale, attract, 
motivate, or retain high quality individuals.  
• Supporting the troops in the field:  Ensuring forward deployed troops have 
the proper size and mix of forces, equipment, and support to successfully 
carry out and accomplish the mission. Supporting the troops means 
providing adequate capabilities that enhance or increase the effectiveness 
of U.S. forces abroad.  
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• Maintaining force readiness:  Ensuring a ready and available warfighting 
force. 
• Investment in current capabilities:  Enhancing the conventional combat 
capabilities that will maintain traditional superiority against current or 
future threats. 
• Investment in future capabilities:  Enhancing the combat capabilities that 
will ensure superiority against future threats.  Future capabilities are those 
that are characterized by a leap in technology. 
• Managing internal processes:  Changing the how the DoD does business.  
Managing internal processes involves overhauling or streamlining 
processes in efforts to become the most efficient organization in terms of 
matching resources to requirements.  
• Transforming DoD infrastructure:  Changing the underlying framework or 
features of a system within the DoD. 
• Protecting the homeland:  Efforts to strengthen the defense and security of 
the American people.  Protecting the homeland means protecting the peace 
and prosperity of American citizens.  
• Other:  Issues not framed by the President’s budget press releases.  
C. OPERATIONALIZATIONS 
Operationalization is a term that describes the process of selecting a unit of 
analysis (Neuendorf, 2002).  A unit analysis is an “identifiable message or message 
component, (a) which serves as the basis for identifying the population and drawing a 
sample, (b) on which variables are measured, or (c) which serves as the basis for 
reporting analyses” (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 71).  A unit of analysis is simply how the 
analyst chooses to break up the communication being analyzed.  Holsti (1969, pp. 647–
648) discusses five major recording units (units of analysis) used in content analysis: (1) 
the single word or symbol, (2) the theme, (3) the character, (4) the paragraph, the 
sentence, or other grammatical units, and (5) the item.  
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The golden rule in content analysis is that each unit of analysis can only be coded 
by one variable (see Neuendorf, 2002; Holsti, 1969).  In the process of operationalization, 
“the researcher should try to achieve several things: categories or levels that are 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive and an appropriate level of measurement” (Neuendorf, 
2002, p. 118).  The analyst must ensure that every category (unit of analysis) must be 
specific to only one code or variable, and that every unit of analysis is measurable.  This 
requirement may create the need for categories (variables) such as “other” and “general” 
(Neuendorf, 2002, p. 118).  
The unit of analysis for the SASC hearings on military posture is every change of 
theme.  Themes are analogous to topic issues.  Units are coded every time a member of 
the SASC changes topic.  Changes in topic are very distinct because Senators are allotted 
a set amount of time to articulate their concerns.  Senators usually move on to other 
topics quite abruptly.  Refer to the following example below (excerpt from FY 2010 
SASC DoD Authorizations for Appropriations hearing on military posture):  
Senator MCCASKILL:  Before I get into my arguing with you, I want to 
briefly also bring to your attention a story that concerned me yesterday in 
the New York Times about Dr. Kuklow.  As we approach healthcare 
reform, there is this fuzzy line between pharmaceutical companies and the 
practice of medicine in the country as it relates to consulting fees and 
being paid.  It was reported yesterday that one of our Army doctors at the 
Walter Reed Army Medical Center had fraudulently done surveys and 
studies on behalf of a private pharmaceutical company. 
What really offends me about that is that potentially he was using data 
from our wounded warriors, and I urge you to look into that.  Personally, I 
know you brought some accountability to Walter Reed after the last 
scandal there.  I want to make sure that our doctors there are reflecting the 
finest, because I know they are the finest and I know they do great work, 
and so I’d ask you to look into that. 
 
Okay, now what I want to argue with you about—I understand the 
decisions you’re making as it relates to transition on stealth, and 
unmanned, and all of that, but I think I’m stating factually, we have a gap 
in fighters.  If we’re going to do 11 carriers, which is my understanding, 
you’re recommending 11 carriers—  
 
Secretary GATES:  Until 2040.  
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Senator MCCASKILL: —until 2040, we have 11 carriers.  We have a gap.  
We have the JSF, which is over cost, behind schedule, unproven.  We 
have an F–18 that is around $15 million a copy, versus the JSF, which is 
around $135 million a copy now.  Who’s to say what it will end up being, 
but that is what it is now, and we have this gap of 200 or more fighters on 
our carriers.  I’m curious—with my auditor’s hat on, knowing the cost 
savings of a multi-year procurement.  Knowing of that gap, knowing of 
the capability, and how used the F–18 is, why we would not be looking at 
a multi-year procurement to fill in that gap as we approach the JSF down 
the line (p. 374). 
 
In the above example, Senator McCaskill changed topics once.  This indicates two 
recording units.  During the first couple of paragraphs, she presented her concerns about 
the Walter Reed Army Medical Center fraudulently conducting surveys and studies on 
behalf of private pharmaceutical companies.  The second half of Senator McCaskill’s 
utterance deals with the gap in fighters aboard carriers.  That same methodology was 
followed during the coding of every transcript.  
D. CODING METHODOLOGY 
Appendix A contains the coding scheme employed in this project.  Each variable 
was assigned an arbitrary code (e.g., A1, A2, A3...) corresponding to each of the issue 
categories.  The content analysis software program Atlas.ti 6.2 was used to identify and 
mark each recording unit, assign codes to each recording unit, and create clarifying 
memos or comments.  The military posture hearings always begin with opening 
statements from the chairman, the SECDEF, and the CJCS.  Any written statements or 
testimony included for the record was purposely omitted.  The coding process applied to 
live dialogue only.  Atlas.ti 6.2 kept track of the occurrences of each variable for 
subsequent quantitative analysis. 
Recording units assigned A9 (Other) were put into subcategories by assigning 
codes A9–BR (for budget related) or A9–NBR (for not budget related).  Clarifying 
comments describing the content of these issues were recorded as well.  The clarifying 
comments were used to further breakdown the subcategories into more specific 
categories (which will be discussed later). 
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Refer back to the example above.  Two recording units were identified.  The first 
recording unit was assigned a code of A9–NBR.  The concern expressed was not related 
to a budgeted item.  The Senator simply inquired about a situation she was concerned 
about.  The second recording unit addresses the gap in fighter aircraft aboard aircraft 
carriers.  This recording unit was assigned a code of A4 (investment in current 
capabilities).  Current capabilities are conventional capabilities that maintain traditional 
superiority against enemy threats.  This coding process was repeated for all ten hearings. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
A. RESULTS 
This study posed one research question: What are the implications of framing 
effects by the President’s budget on issue attention in congressional hearings on the 
defense budget?  The analysis begins with a discussion of the framing identified in the 
President’s budget press releases.  Next, data from the congressional hearings will be 
analyzed.  Specifically, I examine two aspects of the SASC hearings on the defense 
budget: (1) how Congress framed the debate, and (2) whether Congress was responsive to 
the President’s budget framing.  
1. Framing of the President’s Budget 
The framework of the President’s budget press releases, for the sake of this 
specific study, is considered fixed.  At this point in the budget process—the end of the 
executive formulation phase and the start of the congressional action phase, there is no 
doubt about how the President framed his debate.  The President’s goal is to convince 
Congress that his proposed budget is truly a “best fit” for the DoD.  The key themes of 
the President’s budget press releases from fiscal years 2001 to 2010 were strikingly 
similar; that is, the language was very consistent from year to year.  Across all ten fiscal 
years, eight key themes emerged: (1) Quality of life services, (2) Supporting troops in the 
field, (3) Managing force readiness, (4) Investment in current capabilities, (5) Investment 
in future capabilities, (6) Managing internal processes, (7) Transforming DoD processes, 
and (8) Protecting the homeland.  These eight themes constitute the framework of the 
President’s budget for the DoD. 
What the key themes of the President’s budget press releases represent is desired 
end state.  Whatever budget decisions were proposed for any particular fiscal year, was in 
effect, the means by which to achieve the desired end state of the military.  The 
President’s budget press releases consistently used themes that were uncontroversial.  For 
example, phrases such as, supporting the troops, reshaping the force, modernizing 
capabilities, changing how we buy, and reforming the budget, were key themes of the 
 28
fiscal year 2010 President’s budget press release.  Those themes are hard to argue against.  
Similarly, the fiscal year 2002 press release had themes that are uncontroversial: 
improving military morale, increasing readiness, transforming military capabilities, 
changing infrastructure, and pursuing a new management direction. 
Subheadings under each key theme provide examples of major budget decisions 
that support principle objectives.  Take fiscal year 2010 for example.  The first theme is 
supporting troops and their families.  Troops and their families are supported through: 
“fully funding” military healthcare; increasing pay for military and civilian employees; 
“fully protecting” and “properly funding” the ongoing growth in military end strength; 
funding the housing program; and “recognizing the responsibility” to care for the 
wounded, ill or injured.  Examples of budget decisions that support the principle 
objective of reshaping the force include: increasing intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance support by funding 50 unmanned Predator-class aerial vehicles; increase 
funding for helicopters to sustain operations and address the principal limitation on 
capacity; and boosting global partnership capacity by providing additional funding to 
train and equip foreign militaries.  The same format is followed for the remaining key 
themes addressed in the President’s budget press releases.  
A few more words on the President’s budget press releases.  There are two 
additional observations I wish to bring attention to.  First, three of the most common 
themes mentioned in every press release from fiscal year 2001 to 2010 were: (1) 
supporting the troops, (2) modernizing or developing military capabilities, and (3) 
maintaining force readiness.  Second, I mentioned above how subheadings support these 
key themes.  Take a look at supporting the troops, the budget decisions described under 
these subheadings in the fiscal year 2010 press releases, consists of words that 
characterize the nature of the need.  For example, the phrases fully funding, fully 
protecting, and properly funding, implies that supporting the troops is a critical area that 
must not be shortchanged.  On reshaping the force, phrases such as increase funding, 




indicate that the need to reshape the force is not completely satisfied.  The phrases only 
contribute to the need.  This phenomena can be seen in all of the press releases I 
analyzed. 
2. How Congress Framed the Debate 
The SASC authorization for appropriations hearings on military posture provides 
the first opportunity for committee members to collectively address the SECDEF and the 
CJCS about defense budget proposals.  One should note that the framing of the 
President’s budget is completely organized, thought-out, and rehearsed.  In delivering this 
message, the SECDEF is acting on behalf of the President.  The message is polished, and 
it comes from one person.  Congress’ response is the initial reaction, by a group of 
people, with varying points of views, different ideals, and diverse constituencies.   
As mentioned earlier, I wanted to see whether the framing of the President’s 
budget would guide which issues were addressed during budget hearings.  I used the 
framework of the President’s budget press releases to develop issue categories used to 
code the transcripts, and allowed additional issue categories to emerge as the Senate 
hearings were coded. 
For each of the ten SASC hearing transcripts, the total number of utterances 
within each of the nine categories was tallied.  The totals (including rounded percentages) 




Table 2: Total Number of Issues by Category in the SASC Hearings 
In total, 438 utterances were coded.  Congress addressed issues within the 
framework of the President’s budget press releases, an average of 53% of the time.  A 
total of 231 issues were conceptually associated with the issue categories framed by the 
President’s budget press releases.  The most common issues were maintaining force 
readiness and investment in current capabilities.   
In the literature review I talked about the legislative response to executive budget 
proposals.  I mentioned the phrase “congressional opportunity structure.” Sheingate 
(2006) found that specialized committees with complex jurisdiction offer political 
entrepreneurs increased opportunities to introduce new issues.  Hearings present 
legislative authorities with opportunities to exert their influence on budgetary priorities.  
Approximately 47% of the time, Congress attempted to frame their own issues.  
Additional issues framed by SASC members (including rounded percentages) are 
presented in Table 3. 
Issues FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
Framed by President's Budget total
Quality of Life Services 4 (10%) 2   (4%) 6 (11%) 1  (2%) 2   (5%) 5 (12%) 5 (13%) 4     (7%) 2  (5%) 2   (5%) 33 (7%)
Supporting Troops in the Field 1  (3%) 1   (2%) 3   (6%) 3   (8%) 6 (14%) 13  (22%) 4 (10%) 31 (6%)
Maintaining Force Readiness 3  (8%) 6 (13%) 5   (9%) 2  (5%) 4 (11%) 2   (5%) 5 (13%) 5     (8%) 3   (8%) 5 (12%) 40 (9%)
Investment in Current Capabilit ies 2  (5%) 6 (13%) 6 (11%) 2   (5%) 2   (5%) 6 (14%) 3   (8%) 1     (2%) 4 (11%) 7 (17%) 39 (9%)
Investment in Future Capabilities 4 (10%) 2  (4%) 3   (6%) 3   (7%) 3   (7%) 1   (3%) 2     (3%) 1   (3%) 2   (5%) 21 (5%)
Managing Internal Processes 2   (5%) 1   (2%) 3   (7%) 2   (5%) 2   (5%) 2     (3%) 1   (3%) 1   (2%) 14 (3%)
Transforming DoD Infrastructure 1   (3%) 5 (11%) 4   (8%) 3   (7%) 1   (3%) 1   (2%) 1   (3%) 5     (8%) 21 (4%)
Protecting the Homeland 5 (13%) 8 (18%) 5   (9%) 8 (19%) 1   (3%) 2   (5%) 1   (3%) 1     (2%) 1   (3%) 32 (7%)
Total 22(56%) 31(69%) 32 (60%) 22(51%) 13(35%) 27(63%) 18(45%) 33 (56%) 12 (32%) 21 (50%) 231 (53%)
Additional Framing
Other 17(44%) 14 (31%) 21(40%) 21 (49%) 24 (65%)  16 (37%)  22 (55%) 26 (44%) 25 (68%) 21 (50%) 207 (47%)
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Table 3: Total Number of Issues Framed by SASC Members 
Table 3 is an extension of the “Other” category shown in Table 2.  In total, 207 of 
438 utterances were not conceptually associated with the issue categories framed by the 
President’s budget press releases.  On average, approximately 18% (78 out of 438) of the 
utterances coded in the hearings were budget-related issues which did not fit into the 
framework of the President’s budget press releases, and approximately 30% (129 out of 
438) of the utterances coded in the hearings were either questions or concerns about 
policy matters or statements of general inquiry. 
3.  Was Congress Responsive to the President’s Budget Frame?  
The data in Tables 2 and 3 indicates two significant things. First, “issue attention” 
in congressional hearings on the defense budget is shaped, to a considerable extent, by 
the President’s budget press releases.  Framing by the President’s budget press releases 
affects the balance of issues discussed during the hearings. It is important to note that 
“issue attention” does not necessarily denote “issue agreement.” Although I will 
comment on issue agreement several times throughout the remainder of this study, the 
focus was primarily on issue attention.  The following examples provide evidence that the 
framing by the President’s budget Press releases does affect issue attention in 
congressional hearings.  
As mentioned above, the first key theme of the fiscal year 2010 President’s 
budget press release was “supporting troops and their families.” One way that the 
proposed budget accomplished that principle objective, was by properly funding the 
Issues FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
Framed by SASC members
total
 (1) Budget Related 6 (15%) 10 (22%) 14 (26%) 6 (14%) 7 (19%) 5 (12%) 9 (23%) 6 (10%) 9 (24%) 6 (14%) 78 (18%)
 (2) Not Budget Related
Policy Matters 8 (21%) 3 (7%) 5 (9%) 11 (26%) 11 (30%) 7 (16%) 11 (28%) 14 (24%) 10 (27%) 8 (19%) 88 (20%)
General Inquiry 3 (8%) 1 (2%) 2 (4%) 4 (9%) 6 (16%) 4 (9%) 2 (5%) 6 (10%) 6 (16%) 7 (17%) 41 (10%)
A9 (Other) Total 17(44%) 14 (31%) 21(40%) 21 (49%) 24 (65%)  16 (37%)  22 (55%) 26 (44%) 25 (68%) 21 (50%) 207 (47%)
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ongoing growth in military end strength.  In that same fiscal year’s SASC hearing, three 
out of eighteen Senators addressed that same specific issue.  Refer to the examples below 
(Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2010, 2009):  
Senator LIEBERMAN:  I want to focus in particularly on the U.S. Army, 
which is bearing the largest burden of the wars we are involved in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and to put it in this context. Both you and Admiral Mullen 
said that your top priority is to take care of our personnel, of our All-
Volunteer Forces. In fact, I think in this budget, building on previous 
budgets, we are trying our best to take care of those personnel and their 
families. The problem is there are not enough of them. As a result, they 
are under stress, and so is our military in some ways...Just let me get 
beyond all the numbers to say that by any projection I have seen, we are 
going to need more personnel for at least the next 18 months, certainly 
through fiscal year 2010. I don’t think we have given you enough 
personnel to make this happen (pp. 349–350).  
 
Senator SESSIONS:  Also one of the things I think we need to consider is 
the increase in end strength, the number of personnel in uniform. That 
number, I don’t think we are at the maximum strength that we intend to 
reach, are we, Admiral Mullen? Are we still increasing personnel? 
 
So those numbers indicate to me that we are still pretty stressed in number 
of personnel. General Keane, I think, has called for instead of 500,000 
plus, 700,000. Are you wrestling with that number (p. 351)?  
 
Senator REED:  Will the increase in forces help mitigate those and give us 
the ability to rely less upon air strikes? Is that part of what the buildup was 
about? 
 
Another key theme in the fiscal year 2010 President’s budget press release was 
“reshaping the force.”  One component of reshaping the force included increasing 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support by funding 50 unmanned Predator-
class aerial vehicles. Refer to the comments by Senator Bayh below (Department of 
Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2010, 2009): 
Senator BAYH:  Good. From time to time in the past, I’ve asked about the 
Predators and Reapers and that kind of thing, and not because we produce 
a whole lot out in Indiana, but because there was a weapons system that 
actually helping us in real time, facing some of the challenges we’ve had, 
and that some of my visits to the theater, some of the commanders have 
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expressed that they would like a greater capacity in that area. Admiral, for 
you and the Secretary, have we asked for everything we need in this area? 
The fiscal year 2010 press release also mentioned the need for additional 
helicopters. Senator Udall brought attention to this same issue during his question and 
answer period (Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 
2010, 2009, pp. 378–379).  The fiscal year 2010 press release mentioned boosting global 
partnership capacity by providing additional funding to train and equip foreign militaries. 
Senator’s Levin and Ben Nelson expressed concerns over funding Pakistan’s military to 
aid in efforts on the Global War on Terror.   
Congressional attention on issues framed by the President’s budget press releases 
is fairly consistent from fiscal years 2001 to 2010.  The results indicate favorable framing 
effects (issue attention greater than 50%), all but three years.  In fiscal year 2007, 45% of 
the congressional debate on the defense budget resembled the framework of the 
President’s budget press releases.  In fiscal years 2009 and 2005, the same is true less 
than 36% of the time.  Thirty-six percent is enough of a departure from the average value 
that I consider those two years as outliers.  Interestingly enough, fiscal years 2009 and 
2005 are presidential election years.  The results suggest that Congress is less likely to be 
influenced by strategic framing during presidential election years. 
When Congress did not talk about issues framed by the President’s budget, what 
were they talking about? As mentioned previously, the subcategories that emerged from 
the SASC hearings were constructed by grouping issues assigned to the “Other” category 
into subcategories of similar content. Two categories emerged: (1) budget-related issues 
that did not fit into the framework of the President’s budget press releases, and (2) non-
budget-related questions and concerns about policy matters, and statements of general 
inquiry.  
The A9 budget-related subcategory covered an expanse of issues including, but 
not limited to: defense budget top line, baseline budget requests, defense budget as a 
percentage of GDP, budget allocation, long-term spending, supplemental budget requests, 
continuing resolutions, and unfunded requirements.  These issues generally fit into three  
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categories: budget process, budget allocation, and budget sufficiency.  Refer to the 
following example (Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal 
Year 2006, 2005):  
Senator McCAIN.  Mr. Secretary, what Senator Levin I think is trying to 
get to is part of your presentation. The normal budget cycle is 30 to 33 
months and the supplemental is 9 months, and there are many of us that 
feel that the supplemental which is earmarked for combat operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan has been expanded to a significant degree to other 
programs, such as the modules that Senator Levin just talked about, which 
in the view of many of us should be in the normal authorization process so 
that we can exercise our responsibilities of oversight. They are not 
privileges; they are responsibilities (p. 342). 
 
In the above example, Senator McCain was concerned about the budget process.  
Inserting funds for programs not directly related to combat operations into supplemental 
appropriations takes away from Congress’ oversight responsibilities. Lindsay (1987) 
wrote heavily on congressional mistrust and micromanagement of the DoD.  During the 
fiscal year 2009 SASC hearing, Senator Ben Nelson advocated the need for a budget that 
was both precise and accurate.  He mentioned to Defense Secretary Gates that the budget 
looked like a “fudge-it” budget.  What Senator Nelson meant by “fudge it,” was that 
“uncertainty” created a gap between a budget that was both precise and accurate.  That 
gap made it difficult to predict a budget; therefore, some of the numbers got “fudged” in 
for that particular fiscal year.  
When Congress is dissatisfied with what the DoD is doing, they are more inclined 
to get involved in the process.  During the coding process, I came across many examples 
where committee members expressed their frustrations with how the DoD handled the 
budget process.  The following example is from the fiscal year 2007 SASC DoD 
Authorizations for Appropriations hearing on military posture: 
Senator McCAIN: As I count it, this year you will be submitting your 
seventh emergency supplemental of some $50 billion, we are told, 
coming to a total of some $400 billion in the last 5 years to 4 years that 
are emergency supplementals. 
 
I do not know how you call it an emergency any more when we know 
that we are going to have costs for a number of years associated with the 
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Iraq war. So what it effectively is, is an end run around the authorization 
process, going directly to the appropriations committees. For example, in 
last year’s emergency request I counted $5 billion in unauthorized 
earmarks. 
 
It has to stop. Your requests have to be included in the normal budget 
process, in the normal authorization and appropriations process, because 
we all know and can estimate that the war in Iraq and Afghanistan is 
going to cost a certain amount of money. So to continuously come up 
here with an emergency, which we all fully anticipate, although maybe 
not the exact numbers, and not go through the authorizing process, is 
something that has become unacceptable and it has to stop. 
 
Now, Mr. Secretary, are you going to continue to do business by coming 
up here with emergency supplementals which thoroughly bypass the 
entire authorizing process, which is supposed to be the way the Congress 
of the United States operates (pp. 45–46)? 
 
Senator McCain’s previous two examples are a few of the many examples in 
which SASC members express their dissatisfaction with how the Executive branch’s 
deviations from the standard budget processes undermine Congressional oversight 
responsibilities.   
Congress was also concerned with budget allocation.  The President’s budget 
press releases framed budget allocation as something that contributed to modernizing 
capabilities, supporting the troops, force readiness, etc.  Congress tended to frame issues 
concerning budget allocation in terms of appropriation title.  Seeing this a few times 
throughout the coding process makes it worth mentioning.  Here is an example from 
Senator Lieberman (Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal 
Year 2002, 2001): 
Senator LIEBERMAN:  Therefore, there is some room for this 
committee, hopefully, to make some independent judgments about the 
budget. I would just say briefly, in response to Mr. Chairman, on the 
RDT&E, it is true that there has been a substantial increase. However, as 
I look at it, most of it, not all of it, is in the defense-wide area, which is 
mostly missile defense and increases to the services. Except for the 
Navy and Marine Corps, it is not great. The one part I do want to focus 
on, and I hope the committee can take a separate look at, is the science 
and technology budget. The total for this year is $9 billion, and you are 
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recommending $8.8 billion. I don’t think we are going to be able to do 
what we need to do unless we are investing in the technologies of the 
future (pp. 205–206).  
 
Congress expressed their concerns about the budget process and budget 
allocation, but they were also concerned about the size of the defense budget (budget 
sufficiency). There was also a lot of mention about the defense budget as a percentage of 
gross domestic product (GDP).   Refer to the following example below (Department of 
Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2009, 2008).  In this example, 
Senator Inhofe expressed his concern about the size of the budget as a percentage of 
GDP.  This is evidence that Congress is (or attempts to be) fiscally responsible: 
Senator INHOFE: It’s been 7 years since that’s really been discussed with 
this panel, and you talked about percentages of GDP, where we’ve been in 
the past, and where we are today. I believe I’m accurate when I say that if 
you go back to the 100years of the 20th century that it averaged 5.7 
percent of GDP. Then of course, at the end of the drawdowns of the 1990s 
it went down to under 3 percent, about 2.7 percent. 
 
So, having said that, where we are today if we include the supplemental 
spending over this last year would be up to 4.7 percent; without that, 3.7 
percent. I know you’ve probably given some thought in looking into the 
future about where we should be. Do you want to share any thoughts with 
us that you’ve had on that subject (pp. 29–30)? 
 
I have provided a few examples of budget-related issues which did not fit into the 
framework of the President’s budget press releases. Now I will examine issues which I 
have coded “not budget-related.”  Over 30% of the utterances within each hearing 
involved Senators questioning or commenting about matters relating to policy, or making 
general comments about matters completely unrelated to the budget.  First I will say a 
few words on general inquiry.  The general inquiry category captured thoughts, concerns, 
questions, or comments that were not budget-related, and clearly did not fit into any 
organized category.  Most of the utterances coded in the general inquiry category 
reflected the committee member’s individual motivations.  For example, in the fiscal year 
2007 hearings, Senator Graham expressed concern over the legal proceedings of the 
uniformed code of military justice.  There is an example above, from the fiscal year 2010 
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hearings in which Senator McCaskill is concerned about Walter Reed Army Medical 
Center fraudulently conducting surveys and studies on behalf of private pharmaceutical 
companies.  In fiscal year 2008, Senator Dole probed the SECDEF for his position on the 
need for follow-on legislation similar in manner to the Goldwater-Nichols Act.  The 
hearings present an opportunity for committee members to frame, or bring attention to 
their own, individual issues.   
Approximately 70% of non-budget-related issues deal with matters concerning 
policy.  During the fiscal year 2010 hearing, there was a lot of discourse about the 
political stability of Pakistan.  Six of eighteen senators asked questions or made 
comments about the DoD’s position towards Pakistan.  SASC committee members 
expressed a lot of concern about how the Pakistani leadership is not committed to 
fighting the war on terrorism in their territory.  How was DoD going to respond to this 
issue?  In fiscal years 2005 through 2009 there was a lot of discourse about the policy 
towards Iraq and Afghanistan.  Things such as risk sharing with other nations, reliability 
of the Iraqi army, the Iraqi constitution, policy towards prisoners, drugs in Afghanistan, 
and long term strategy, were all policy points of interest for SASC members.  Congress 
was concerned about the implications of DoD’s decision-making.  Policy decisions made 
by the DoD have political ramifications, as well as long term implications on budget 
resources; therefore, Congress was interested in being a part of those decisions.  In the 
following example, Senator Warner asked the DoD to include Congress in decisions 
made in Iraq and Afghanistan (Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations 
for Fiscal Year 2009, 2008): 
Senator WARNER: I just feel that Congress should be made a full partner 
in the decisions with respect to both Afghanistan and Iraq as we go 
forward into the next administration, and that we need the support of 
Congress because therein rests the support of the American people. So I 
do hope that you lay that foundation (p. 25).  
 
B. ASSESSMENT OF MODEL 
Ten random utterances were chosen from the SASC hearings transcripts and 
coded by two separate individuals.  Out of 20 utterances, a 70% overlap in the results was 
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achieved.  The first coder overlapped with six out of ten categories, and the second coder 
overlapped with eight out of ten.  Neuendorf (2002) associates a reliability coefficient of 
90% or better as acceptable to all, and a reliability coefficient of 80% or better as 
acceptable in most situations (p. 143).  Anything below 80% would be subject to 
disagreement.  For the sake of this project, 70% coder reliability was deemed acceptable.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 
SASC authorization for appropriations hearings on military posture presents 
opportunities for its members to collectively engage in constructive dialogue with the 
SECDEF and the CJCS following the release of the President’s budget.  The President’s 
budget reflects national priorities.  On behalf of the President, the SECDEF and the CJCS 
are called as primary witnesses before Congress to defend those priorities.  The way that 
the budget is framed is of the utmost importance. Framing theory suggests that framing 
effects occur when a message is emphasized strategically, such that it causes individuals 
to focus on relevant considerations when constructing their opinions.  The President’s 
budget press releases are just one way that the executive branch communicates their 
agendas to Congress.  Setting a national policy agenda involves figuring out “how to 
guide other players, rather than be swept along by their initiatives (Davidson, 2002, p. 72)  
The differences between legislative and executive agendas are really a function of 
varying priorities.  Those who seek to compare congressional budget priorities to 
presidential budget priorities often measure the difference between the President’s 
proposed budget figures and the subsequent congressional modifications of those figures.  
Comparing budget priorities through examining the framework of rhetorical debates on 
budget issues provides more substantive approach to understanding dynamics of 
communication exchange within the legislative and executive realm.  The purpose of this 
study was to fill the gap on political communication by examining whether Congress was 
responsive to framing by the President’s budget.  To accomplish this, I used the 
framework of the President’s budget press releases from fiscal years 2001 to 2010 to 
analyze the content of SASC hearings on the defense budget.   
My findings indicate that over half of the time, issue attention in congressional 
hearings is shaped by the frame of the President’s budget.  Approximately 53% of the 
time Congress addressed issues that were conceptually related.  However, issue attention 
was not the same thing as issue agreement.  The key themes in the President’s budget 
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press releases were chosen such that the principle objective or the desired end state was 
difficult to argue against.  Congress generally agreed with the desired end-state 
(supporting the troops, protecting the homeland, etc.), but they did not necessarily agree 
with what the decisions that the executive branch proposed to achieve those ends.  
Congress examined the budget requests.  When they disagreed with some of the decisions 
that were proposed in the President’s budget, they wanted to know what the DoD wanted 
to buy, how much the DoD wanted to buy, the costs associated with what they were 
buying, why the DoD decided to buy it, how would buying it help to achieve the desired 
end state, and what the follow-on implications were.  Rarely was anything taken at face 
value. 
It is highly unlikely that all people will respond to frames.  Nelson et al. (1997) 
suggests that relatively knowledgeable people (i.e., political elites) do not necessarily 
have fixed opinions on political issues.  Attitudes on political issues “should properly 
refer to a range of potential evaluative expressions, tied to a foundation of beliefs, 
emotional responses, and past behavioral episodes that combine in varying strengths...” 
(Nelson et al., 1997, p. 237).  What Nelson et al. is trying say, is that frames ignite 
specific consideration for issues, but the weight of consideration is affected by 
endogenous factors. 
Approximately 47% of the time, Congress did not respond to issues within the 
framework of the President’s budget, in fact, they created their own frame.  The SASC 
hearings provide the first opportunity for Congress to collectively address the defense 
budget.  Congress does not come to these hearings completely blinded.  Oleszek (1989), 
as cited in Diermeier and Fedderson (2000), contends that congressmen attend hearings 
with a list of prepared questions and expected responses.  The President’s budget is a 
finished product.  Congressional scrutiny of the budget is just beginning.  The executive 
branch and Congress have competing priorities.  The literature review explained how the 
President’s budget was more interdependent.  At this point, Congress has not been as 
integrated into the budget process, and because it is a committee and not a single entity, 
their questions might appear disjointed.  Congress tries as much as it can to be prepared; 
therefore, they spent a little time addressing issues framed by the President’s budget.  
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They considered the issues highlighted in the President’s budget press releases, then they 
went into expressing whatever additional concerns they had about the budget and about 
other policy areas related to national security, even if only indirectly related to the 
budget.  Thurber (2002) describes Congress and the executive branch, as both rivals and 
partners.   
In framing their own issues, Congress spent a considerable amount of time 
critiquing the defense budget process.  Congress wanted to be more involved in decision-
making.  Committee members felt that the lack of transparency in the budget process 
encumbered Congress’ responsibility to provide oversight.  As evidenced in the literature 
review, this sort of self-perpetuating relationship increases mistrust and promotes 
micromanagement.  Shull (1979) proposed that the lack of communication between the 
executive branch and Congress is attributed to differences in how both sides view federal 
agencies.  There is some evidence of that here.  Congress had a negative perception of the 
DoD in terms of how they manage the budget process.  
Congress also looked at whether or not the budget was sufficient (i.e., how large it 
was, and whether it was enough to accomplish the principle objectives).  Congress 
commented a lot about the growth-rate in the defense budget.  They also expressed 
concerns about how the budget was allocated.  Kanter (1972) argued that programmatic 
explanations have the greatest potential for impacting defense policy, but maintaining 
tight control over fiscal posture still remains a top priority for Congress.  Approximately 
1 in 5 of the utterances recorded in this study had something to do with the overall 
allocation to defense.  
When Congress framed their comments outside the President’s structure, it 
normally concerned defense policy.  The results confirmed the presence of what Lindsay 
(1987) referred to as the “outside game,” that is, the increasing desire for Congress to 
encroach on defense policy.  The “outside game” erodes the committee system by 
creating an environment in which congressional issue attention becomes more 
individualistic.  This study presented evidence that Congress uses a portion of the 
hearings to bring attention to (frame) their own individual issues.   
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In summary, this research concludes three main things. First, the framework of 
the President’s budget press releases appears to guide issue attention in Congressional 
hearings.  Specifically, Congress has a tendency to frame their questions and discussions 
around the key issues set forth by the President’s budget.  Although presidential framing 
can guide issue attention, external events such as presidential elections might guide issue 
attention, as well.  Second, Congress frames their own issues during congressional 
hearings.  Congress used the hearings to frame additional concerns over the defense 
budget, issues concerning defense policy, and many individual issues and concerns, as 
well.  The executive branch seeks to influence the legislative branch, and the legislative 
branch seeks to influence the executive branch.  Both sides need each other.  Third, 
Congress wants to be more involved in the overall budget process.  On several occasions, 
Congress outright expressed dissatisfaction with their level of inclusion in the decision-
making process. 
The nature of the relationship between the executive branch and Congress, in the 
absence of a consolidated theory or framework, is consistent with the literature.  It 
explained why Congress’ priorities were different from the President’s.  The literature 
review illustrated Congress’ desire to exert an increasing sphere of influence on national 
policy.  It provided an indication of Congress’ growing mistrust and subsequent attempts 
to micromanage the DoD.  I was able to begin my analysis with a satisfying level of 
expectations. 
Many scholars have dedicated significant time and effort to examine what 
motivates political actors.  Scholars have also completed very compelling works on 
political media and its effect on public opinion.  What is different about this study, is that 
it combines these two topic areas by examining how political actors interact and 
influence each other.  Similar research in this field is fragmented.  This study is aimed at 
bringing together some of the concepts that were presented in the literature review.   
B. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
This study finds its advantage in being the first of its kind—the first use the 
President’s budget press releases to determine whether the President’s message framing 
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can guide issue attention in congressional hearings.  Although the current study has many 
strengths, several limitations must be discussed.  First, the research materials cover only a 
span of ten years.  A wider sample could have provided more comprehensive and 
consistent results.  This belief is in-line with the conventional thought that the more data, 
the better.   
Second, this research precluded examining opening statements or submitted 
statements for the record.  Opening statements or submitted statements for the record may 
have a significant impact on the trajectory of the hearings.  A critical assumption 
embedded in this project was that the SECDEF framed the budget debate during his 
testimony before Congress exactly as it was framed for the press.  Research on framing 
suggests that strategic messages are tailored to the audiences intended to receive the 
message.  It is perfectly plausible that the SECDEF may frame the defense budget debate 
differently when addressing members of Congress.  
Third, coder reliability was not optimal.  Content analytic research usually 
involves more than one coder because the volume of content examined is often 
burdensome, and a high measure of subjectivity can invalidate the results.  The coding 
process typically involves two or more individual coders that complete the entire coding 
process individually.  The goal is to achieve an acceptable percent overlap.  For the sake 
of time, and due to the lack of willing participants, a less rigorous assessment of 
reliability was employed.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This study provides a concrete foundation for additional research in framing 
theory, specifically as it pertains to political communication.  Anyone who is interested in 
studying the dynamic relationship between the executive branch and Congress should 
find this data useful.    Those interested in the content analytic research methodology may 
also find this study beneficial.  
I encourage future work to build upon the results presented in this research paper.  
There are several opportunities to advance this research.  For example, it may be 
worthwhile for someone to extend this study over a greater length of time.  The data 
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presented indications that framing by the President’s budget press releases has less of an 
effect during presidential election years.  One might hypothesize this phenomenon. 
Those interested may explore whether congressional “issue attention” has 
anything to do with party affiliation.  This research ignored whether the President and/or 
SASC members were democrats or republicans.  There is also evidence to suggest that 
the House has stronger influence on defense issues (see Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004).  
Future research might be directed at replicating this research using hearing transcripts 
from House Armed Services Committee as opposed to the Senate.  It would be interesting 
to make a comparison of the data. 
Regardless whether anyone wishes to expand the scope of this project, my hopes 
are that this study will help strengthen the connection between politics and 
communications research.  Everyone is affected by the decisions that the executive and 
legislative branches make.  It is important to understand how both sides interact.   
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APPENDIX. CODEBOOK 
The twenty-first century represents a new age in which irregular warfare 
dominates, but the threat of conventional attacks still exists.  These codes were developed 
with the realization that the national security strategy identifies the U.S. military as a 
global force.  Terrorism (and thus the GWOT) was coded into the topics because it 
represents a particular aspect of that topic.  
 
Code Extensional Definitions 
A1: Quality of 
life services 
Increases in pay and benefits, housing allowance and other subsidies, 
affordable health care programs, childcare services, proper treatment 
and benefits for the wounded, ill, or injured. 
 
A2: Supporting 
troops in the 
field 
The sustainment or replenishment of equipment and supplies, 
providing the right amount of equipment to meet the threat, force 
protection, not putting the troops in excess danger, providing adequate 
intelligence and command control capabilities in the field, efforts to 
build and strengthen military and security capabilities of global 
partners to increase the effectiveness of U.S. forces, training friendly 





Establishing proper training and maintenance cycles (i.e. flight hour 
program, steaming days), ensuring high levels of proficiency, ensuring 
units are adequately prepared and properly rested, building and 
strengthening the reserve component, maintaining force depth, 
managing the demand on the force, base and facility support, National 
guard and reserves affairs, military modernization, consequences of 





Investment in capabilities or technologies which are intended to meet 
the current threat, this includes RDT&E and procurement activities, 
modernization of the conventional force, enhancing current 






Code Extensional Definitions 
A5: Investment in 
future capabilities 
Future capabilities are designed to counter unconventional threats, 
unmanned systems, enhanced mobility, new concepts, future 




Changes to the acquisition, procurement, budgeting, or financial 
management system; management controls; becoming more 





Streamlining or upgrading DoD facilities, changes in the operational 
or administrative command structure, BRAC, proper amount of 
civilian and DoD support staff, military installations, depot 




Ballistic missile defense (BMD), detection and protection against 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), emergency response systems, 
countering the threat of catastrophic weapons, protecting our ports 
and citizens from terror attacks, interagency cooperation, homeland 
command and communication systems. 
 
A9:  Other Category added to fulfill the requirements of mutual exclusiveness 
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